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biotechnological utilization in violation of either the provider 
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Biopiracy is defined as a problem resulting from a distributive 
conflict between provider and user countries, the practical 
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transnational context, and the pervasive scientific uncertainty 
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the necessary enforcement provisions for deterring non-
compliance through effective monitoring and sanctions. Using the 
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ince the 1980s, plant genetic resources (GR) are increasingly being 
used for biotechnological research and development. While the largest 
share of global plant biodiversity is concentrated in several countries of the Global 
South, the technological capacities for transforming genetic raw materials into 
commercially viable products, from pharmaceuticals to cosmetics up to improved
varieties of crops, are predominantly found in industrialized countries. GR had 
been available to commercial and non-commercial users without restrictions 
under the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, being 
considered part of the "common heritage of mankind" (International Undertaking, 
Article 01). Developing countries with large amounts of domestic plant 
biodiversity began challenging this open access regime when unrestricted South-
North germplasm flows translated increasingly into Intellectual Property-
protected inventions, with the resulting economic benefits being appropriated by 
private entities originating from the Global North (BRAND et al., 2008; ROSENDAL, 
2000).  
The term "biopiracy" loosely refers to "the use of intellectual property 
systems to legitimize the exclusive ownership and control over biological 
resources and biological products that have been used over centuries in non-
industrialized cultures" (SHIVA, 2001. p. 49). Since the 1990s, a number of high 
profile cases of biopiracy have been the subject of intense controversies (BARDI et 
al., 2011; HAMILTON, 2006; LIANG, 2011; MGBEOJI, 2006; ROBINSON, 2010). In 
parallel, conflicts regarding the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
global governance quickly extended to the linkage between biopiracy and 
international patent law. Since the late 1990s, biopiracy has been under discussion 
in various international settings, from the WTO and its Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) (ANDERSEN, 2008; VIVAS-EUGUI, 2012; WILKE, 2013). In 2004, the CBD's 
Conference of the Parties (COP) mandated negotiations on an international regime 
for implementing the Convention's objective of the "fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources" (CBD Article 01). 
This led to the conclusion, in October 2010, of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
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Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol). The Protocol has been signed by 91 states and 
the European Union (EU), and entered into force on 12th October 2014. 
The Protocol is presently the only international agreement providing a 
comprehensive legal framework for addressing biopiracy, here understood as the 
utilization of GR without the provider country's consent or in violation of mutually 
agreed contractual terms. Drawing on the literature on regime effectiveness (HOVI 
et al., 2003; MITCHELL, 2006; UNDERDAL, 2002), I assess the degree to which 
Protocol will contribute to fair and equitable benefit-sharing. First, focusing on 
problem structure and regime design, I argue that biopiracy is a particularly 
malignant problem resulting from distributional conflicts between (private) users 
and provider countries1, the technical difficulty of monitoring utilization of GR in a 
transnational context, and the international constellation of interests. Second, I 
make the case that the Protocol emphasizes compliance management over 
enforcement, which will likely be insufficient to ensure fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in those cases where commercial stakes are involved. Third, I show that its 
legal ambiguities allow for the implementation of legislation to minimize the 
regulatory impact on domestic users. In sum, the Protocol is a weak response to a 
difficult problem. 
The rest of this text is organized as follows. Section 02 addresses biopiracy 
in the context of biotechnology and intellectual property rights. I highlight the 
North-South dimension of biopiracy while showing that the problem is 
characterized by significant conceptual ambiguity as well as uncertainty regarding 
its extent and economic costs. Section 03 introduces the theoretical framework, 
drawing on the literature on regime effectiveness and compliance. Section 04 
assesses the problem structure of biopiracy, arguing that both the international 
constellation of interests and the difficulties related to transnational monitoring 
and enforcement significantly complicate effective international action. Section 05 
                                                      
1 The term "user" here refers to commercial (i.e., multinational companies in sectors such 
as pharmaceuticals, agriculture or cosmetics) and non-commercial actors (i.e., public 
research institutions or botanical gardens) that use GR in a broad range of 
biotechnological innovation processes. The term "user country" broadly refers to 
countries with relatively large amounts of users under their jurisdiction, being frequently 
identical with "industrialized country". Where necessary, I use the term "private users" in 
order to avoid terminological confusion. 
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turns to the relevant provisions under the CBD. While "biopiracy" is not defined 
under international law, the CBD's provisions distinguish between two types: the 
acquisition of GR in violation of a provider country's domestic laws and regulations 
on the one hand, and their utilization in breach of contractual agreements between 
the user and provider countries on the other hand. Section 06 analyzes the 
relevant provisions of the Nagoya Protocol, arguing both that its enforcement 
components are insufficient for deterring intentional non-compliance based on 
cost-benefit analysis and that the ambiguity of the legal text allows for flexible 
implementation in user countries wishing to cushion its domestic impact. 
However, the provisions on international access standards will facilitate 
compliance with provider country legislation by reducing legal uncertainty, 
transaction costs and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Section 07 analyzes 
the Protocol's implementation in the EU which, of all parties, possesses the largest 
market for biotechnology. I show that the implementing regulation emphasizes 
management over enforcement and exploits a critical loophole regarding the 
Protocol's temporal scope. Section 08 concludes this article. 
 
The political and economic context 
The expression "genetic resources" broadly encompasses the 
microphysical properties of biological materials from plant, microbial, animal and 
other sources as well as the genetic information which those materials contain 
(TVEDT and SCHEI, 2014). GR find application in a broad number of industrial 
processes, ranging from pharmaceuticals to cosmetics up to agricultural and 
industrial applications. While the technological capacities for the utilization of GR 
are concentrated in industrialized countries, the highest levels of biodiversity, and 
thus of potentially valuable materials, are found in developing countries. In 2006, 
41.5% of  international applications for biotechnology patents under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty originated in the US, 27.4% in the EU, 11.9% in Japan and 4% 
in the BRIICS countries (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China and 
South Africa) (VAN BEUZEKOM and ARUNDEL, 2009, p. 71). At the same time, 44% 
of all vascular plants worldwide are concentrated in 25 biodiversity hotspots, most 
of them located in the Global South, such as South-East Asia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador 
and Madagascar (MYERS et al., 2000). 
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The term "biopiracy" came to prominence in the late 1990s. On a general 
level, it refers to the commercial utilization of GR (frequently originating in 
developing countries) for the development of inventions protected by patents or 
plant variety rights (SHIVA, 2001). This poses two distinct problems. First, market 
access for protected goods containing GR may become subject to restrictions, as 
authorization by the rights holder is required for, inter alia, import and export 
(TRIPS Article 28.1.a; UPOV Convention Article 1.a.v-vi). Second, most states, with 
the notable exception of the US, have committed themselves to ensuring that any 
benefits arising from the utilization of GR are shared fairly and equitably with the 
provider country (CBD Article 01; see Section 05 below). In practice, this objective 
is relatively easy to circumvent by commercial actors eager to avoid potentially 
costly compensation schemes. 
Evidence of biopiracy is mainly anecdotal, and comprehensive 
assessments of its global costs do not exist. As it is considered an illegal activity 
under the domestic laws of many provider countries (RENNER et al., 2012), it is 
relatively easy to avoid detection when illegally accessing GR (see Section 04 
below). Without a global tracking mechanism for the use of GR in patent 
applications, calculating the frequency with which biopirated materials are utilized 
in various innovation processes is next to impossible. More fundamentally, any 
cost assessment needs a counterfactual baseline of the benefits that would be 
received by a provider country, if biopiracy were absent and bilateral benefit-
sharing arrangements had been negotiated between the user and the provider 
country. However, calculating the opportunity costs of biopiracy based on the 
outcomes of hypothetical negotiation, involving significant uncertainty about the 
future commercial value of inventions developed through the utilization of GR, is 
not feasible. 
While biopiracy is not a defined term under international law and is 
insufficiently understood in its economic dimensions, a range of anecdotal 
episodes exist which are widely recognized as instances of biopiracy (see 
ROBINSON, 2010 for a comprehensive overview): 
 
- In 1995, a patent for an antifungal product was granted by the European Patent 
Office (EPO) to the US Department of Agriculture and the US-American firm W.R. 
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Grace and Company, incorporating genetic materials from the Neem tree found in 
India and Nepal.  Components of the Neem tree have been used for traditional 
medicine and cooking for about 2000 years. However, no benefit-sharing 
arrangements were agreed between the users and the Indian authorities. The EPO 
patent was successfully challenged by India on the basis of a prior art claim, 
leading to its revocation in 2005 (SHERIDAN, 2005). 
 
- In 1999, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a patent on the so-
called "Enola Bean", primarily produced in Mexico for export to the US market. The 
patent grant was based on the "distinctness" of the bean's yellow color under the 
1930 Plant Patent Act. The rights holder initiated patent litigation against 
importers that refused to pay royalties (RATTRAY, 2002). In 2008, a US federal 
court revoked the patent due to a lack of novelty and non-obviousness. 
 
- The Hoodia plant has been traditionally used by the native San people in the 
Kalahari Desert. Being a natural appetite suppressant, it allows the San to hunt for 
prolonged periods of time. A patent for a dietary product based on Hoodia was 
granted to the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
in 1997, subsequently licensed first to the UK-based company Phytopharm and 
afterwards to the Anglo-Dutch company Unilever. Due to political and public 
pressure, CSIR agreed to enter into a benefit-sharing agreement with the San 
people, whereby they would receive royalties of between 06-08% of commercial 
profits (WYNBERG and CHENNELLS, 2009). 
 
What these examples have in common are conflicts arising from the 
intersection between sovereignty claims over GR and intellectual property claims 
based either on their immediate parts or on inventions resulting from their 
biotechnological utilization. The differing interests of provider and user countries 
complicate an effective international response to biopiracy, in addition to 
aggravating various problems involving the transnational regulation of private 
agents (see Section 04). As I show in the remainder of this text, both the problem 
structure of biopiracy and the rule design of the Nagoya Protocol lead to low 
regime effectiveness in terms of ensuring that users comply with their benefit-
sharing obligations in a transnational context. 
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Theoretical framework: regime effectiveness and compliance 
Environmental regimes differ in the degree to which they achieve their 
respective objectives (BREITMEIER et al., 2011). Research on the determinants of 
regime effectiveness broadly distinguishes between institutional influence and 
problem structure (MITCHELL, 2006; UNDERDAL, 2002): while the particular 
design of an international regime may be more or less conducive to the 
achievement of a given objective, some problems are intrinsically more difficult to 
solve than others, independent of any rules that states agree on. All assessments of 
regime effectiveness thus need to take into account the particular problem which 
the regime is supposed to address. I follow the general proposition that the 
political malignancy of a problem depends on the international constellation of 
interests (UNDERDAL, 2002). "Easy" problems are those where interests 
significantly overlap. Where interests diverge due to a regime's potential to 
produce highly asymmetrical effects, in terms of costs and benefits, regime 
formation becomes politically difficult and there will be incentives to defect during 
the implementation phase. This issue is exacerbated by the difficulty of monitoring 
the utilization of GR in a transboundary context. As Section 04 shows, biopiracy is 
characterized by a high degree of problem malignancy, decreasing the extent to 
which internationally agreed rules can contribute to fair and equitable benefit-
sharing while creating incentives for implementing those rules in a manner that 
decreases their regulatory scope and depth. 
In this text, I assess effectiveness at the level of outputs; that is, the extent 
to which a regime's rules restructure (private) actors' incentives in order to bring 
their behavior in line with a specific policy objective. While effectiveness may also 
be evaluated by directly observing behavioral changes in those agents subject to a 
regime's rules (YOUNG, 2001), any direct observation of biopiracy faces 
formidable methodological challenges. In addition, with the Nagoya Protocol 
having been entered into force only on 12th October 2014, any resultant behavioral 
changes at the unit level would not have the extended period of time required for 
observation. In the present text, I accordingly understand "effectiveness" as the 
degree to which the Protocol and the parties implementing legislation shape 
incentive structures, with the ultimate goal of having users fairly and equitably 
share the benefits arising from the utilization of GR with provider countries and 
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without, however, attempting to directly observe eventual behavioral changes by 
private users. As Sections 05 and 06 spell out in more detail, the Convention and 
the Protocol establish a procedural standard whereby benefit-sharing is "fair and 
equitable" if users abide by the contractual obligations that have been mutually 
agreed between them and the provider country, or if the provider country waives 
its right to require benefit-sharing in the first place. 
"Effectiveness" is a relational term. In order to assess regime effectiveness, 
we require a baseline against which to compare a regime's actual performance. 
The "Oslo-Potsdam solution" proposes two different standards of evaluation based 
on counterfactual analysis: comparing regime performance to a no-regime 
scenario; and comparing performance to a hypothetical collective optimum (HELM 
and SPRINZ, 2000; HOVI et al., 2003; YOUNG, 2003). The no-regime counterfactual 
allows determination of the degree to which a regime "matters": that is, how far it 
induces behavioral changes relative to business-as-usual. The use of a collective 
optimum as a baseline focuses on the degree to which a regime contributes to 
problem-solving. Both metrics will be used in this paper, and I show that the 
Nagoya Protocol improves the status quo ante by facilitating user compliance with 
the domestic laws and regulations of provider countries. However, it fails to raise 
the costs of non-compliance within those jurisdictions in which utilization takes 
place, thus insufficiently restructuring the incentives of users to ground their 
decision, of whether or not to comply, on cost-benefit analysis. 
Accordingly, as user compliance is critical for the Protocol's effectiveness, I 
draw on the well-established distinction between enforcement- and management-
based approaches to compliance. The former assumes rational actors which weigh 
the cost of compliance against the risk of non-compliance, the latter being a 
function of the expected sanctions and the likelihood of being detected as non-
compliant (DOWNS et al., 1996; GUNNINGHAM and KAGAN, 2005). Conversely, the 
management approach understands rules not as deterring and constraining, but as 
enabling and facilitating (CHAYES and CHAYES, 1993; KRATOCHWIL, 2011; MAY, 
2005). Here, actors are biased towards complying with their obligations due to the 
internalization of social norms, with non-compliance resulting from incapacity or 
rule ambiguity. The management- and enforcement-based approaches thus 
propose different ways to ensure that rules are being followed: facilitating 
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compliance through capacity building and the creation of rules that are easy to 
follow on the one hand, increasing monitoring capacities and sanctions on the 
other. My argument does not commit to whether one or the other approach is 
superior. As Section 06 shows, the Nagoya Protocol emphasizes management over 
enforcement. While this may ameliorate problems of involuntary non-compliance, 
it is insufficient to deter users that weigh the costs of benefit-sharing, and of 
transactions associated with the negotiation of benefit-sharing arrangements, 
against the expected sanctions resulting from being found in non-compliance. 
Theory suggests that, where actors have well-established preferences as well as 
knowledge of the likely consequences of pursuing those preferences, their 
behavior tends towards rational cost-benefit calculation (MARCH and OLSEN, 
1998, pp. 952-953). Thus, where commercial stakes are involved, the relative lack 
of enforcement provisions in the Protocol will matter more than in cases where GR 
are being utilized for non-commercial purposes, such as basic research.  
 
The problem structure of biopiracy 
Biopiracy is characterized by high problem malignancy. User countries 
(primarily industrialized ones) are biased towards the benefits of biopiracy, that is, 
the appropriation of GR by domestic users without entering into negotiated 
payment schemes. For provider countries (primarily developing ones), the costs of 
biopiracy entail both opportunity costs (through lost benefit-sharing 
arrangements) and potential difficulties with market access in the case of goods 
containing GR being patent-protected in export markets (ROBINSON, 2010). This 
bias towards the benefits and costs of biopiracy, respectively, is compounded by 
difficulties related to monitoring and enforcement.  
First, access to GR in violation of a provider country's domestic laws and 
regulations cannot effectively be prevented. While a number of provider countries 
have legislation in place which criminalizes the unauthorized export of domestic 
plant and animal species (RENNER et al., 2012), many biotechnological 
applications do not require bulk commodities of a particular GR but merely its 
genetic code. While customs authorities are, at least in principle, able to detect the 
illegal export of singular plant samples, modern information technology allows for 
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DNA to be sequenced within a provider country and resulting sequence data to be 
digitally transmitted to third countries with minimal risk of detection. 
Secondly, once GR have been illegally acquired, fulfillment of the benefit-
sharing objective hinges on monitoring and enforcement in user jurisdictions. 
Here, the incorporation of GR in patent applications requires a system by which 
legally-accessed resources may be distinguished from illegally-accessed ones, with 
appropriate legal remedies for the latter case. For instance, a number of proposals 
have been made for a disclosure of origin requirement, which would require 
patent applicants to provide evidence that any GR utilized within their inventions 
have been accessed legally and in line with the benefit-sharing objective (CORREA, 
2005; HOARE and TARASOFSKY, 2007). Nevertheless, there are legal concerns that 
a disclosure requirement in patent law would go beyond the substantial and 
formal patentability criteria contained in TRIPS Articles 27.1 and 29, and would be 
incompatible with the Article 27.1 prohibition of discriminatory treatment for 
specific fields of technology. 
An additional challenge arises from the necessity of implementing 
compliance measures in user countries. States with large domestic biotech sectors 
lack economic incentives for enforcing the benefit-sharing objective under their 
domestic patent laws. Such "strong" enforcement could range from patent 
applications not being processed, in the case of non-disclosure of the origin of GR 
used in the respective inventions, up to the revocation of patents already granted. 
Here, the position of major user countries, such as the US, is that acts of biopiracy 
can be dealt with effectively under existing, domestic patent law (UNITED STATES, 
2005). For instance, a patent granted for an invention incorporating 
misappropriated GR could be successfully challenged on the basis of a prior art 
claim, invalidating the patent due to a lack of novelty. 
Biopiracy is thus characterized by diverging interests between provider 
and user countries of GR. Moreover, the possibilities for realizing joint gains are 
limited, as benefit-sharing arrangements are frequently zero-sum games between 
user and provider countries. While user countries have an interest in international 
cooperation in order to facilitate access to GR by users within their jurisdictions 
(WALLBOTT et al., 2014, pp. 38-39), they are in a relationship of asymmetrical 
interdependence with provider countries: access to GR depends less on 
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international cooperation than does benefit-sharing, the latter requiring extensive 
regulatory and legislative adjustments in user countries. Thus, based on the 
international constellation of interests, the lack of economic incentives for the 
voluntary sharing of benefits and the significant technical and legal impediments 
to the effective implementation of the benefit-sharing objective in a transnational 
context, not only does biopiracy constitute a "hard" problem for international 
cooperation, but the regime design itself, both of the CBD and the Protocol, is 
shaped by the underlying problem structure. In other words: gains from 
international cooperation in the issue area primarily accrue to provider countries, 
giving user countries few economic incentives to agree to far-reaching regulatory 
standards under international law. 
 
Biopiracy, misappropriation and misuse 
While the term "biopiracy" is not defined under international law, it is 
conceptually founded in the principle of state sovereignty over natural resources. 
Principle 02 of the 1992 Rio Declaration affirms that "[s]tates have […] the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies" (UNCED, 1992). This principle is 
echoed in the CBD's Article 03, and applies both to GR in their natural habitats 
within a provider country ("in situ") and GR stored in germplasm collections 
within the same or a different jurisdiction ("ex situ"). Furthermore, the Convention 
recognizes that "the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with 
the national governments and is subject to national legislation" (CBD, Article 15.1). 
While states shall facilitate access to GR originating within their respective 
territories (Article 15.2), such access: a) requires their initial authorization, based 
on what purpose and by whom the resource is to be used (Prior Informed Consent, 
PIC); and, b) the subsequent negotiation of a bilateral contract between the 
provider country and the party wishing to utilize the resource (Mutually Agreed 
Terms, MAT). Bilateral Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) contracts define the 
terms under which a private user may utilize a particular GR and, inter alia, set out 
the specific details of monetary and/or non-monetary compensation for the 
provider country. The modalities of benefit-sharing are up to the user and the 
provider country to agree on and may include up-front payments, royalties, 
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sharing of research results, and joint ownership of intellectual property rights or 
capacity building. 
As commercial users lack economic incentives for sharing benefits, CBD 
Article 15.7 obliges contracting parties to take  "legislative, administrative or 
policy measures […] with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results 
of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and 
other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such 
resources". As a framework convention, the CBD only creates general rights and 
obligations related to ABS. Their implementation is the subject of the Nagoya 
Protocol (see Section 06 below). On the basis of the CBD's distinction between PIC 
and MAT, however, it is possible to differentiate between two legally distinct types 
of biopiracy: misappropriation and utilization "in a non-agreed way" (IUCN, 2012, 
p. 12). 
Misappropriation of GR constitutes a case in which a resource has been 
accessed in violation of the provider country's domestic ABS framework, that is, 
where PIC has not been obtained. Addressing misappropriation requires the 
enforcement of third country legislation within a user jurisdiction. Although access 
to GR in ex situ collections is still subject to the PIC requirement, identifying the 
country of origin can be a daunting task even where users are, in principle, willing 
to share the benefits from utilization on fair and equitable terms. GR are frequently 
passed along larger supply chains, including botanical gardens as well as public 
and private laboratories. Failure to identify the origin of a resource here may result 
from the relevant documentation being unavailable or from a user's intent to avoid 
having to enter into benefit-sharing arrangements. Thus, a major difficulty consists 
of determining a reasonable amount of effort that users would unsuccessfully have 
to spend on identifying the country of origin before a GR would be considered as 
belonging to the "orphan" category for which PIC is unavailable. Parties to the 
Nagoya Protocol have committed themselves to considering "the need for and 
modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism" for precisely those 
cases (Nagoya Protocol Article 10). If such a multilateral benefit-sharing regime 
were to be established, incentives to declare a resource as being of unknown origin 
would be weakened, as this would merely switch the applicable benefit-sharing 
regime instead of avoiding benefit-sharing altogether. 
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Once PIC has been granted, user and provider countries enter into 
bilateral negotiations regarding MAT, that is, the terms of access, benefit-sharing 
and other relevant modalities such as dispute settlement clauses. As a private 
contract, non-compliance with MAT is of a different legal nature than non-
compliance with PIC, as it constitutes a breach of contractual obligations under 
private law (CHIAROLLA, 2012). The existence of contractual rights and 
obligations allows for better monitoring of utilization. While instances of 
misappropriation may simply go unnoticed due to patent offices not routinely 
verifying whether PIC and MAT have been established, misuse is easier to detect as 
the identity of the user and the purpose of utilization are known to the provider 
country. Further, enforcement is facilitated through the existence of contractual 
obligations. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol: scope, user measures, international access standards 
Negotiations on an international ABS regime were mandated by CBD COP 
7, 2004 and the Nagoya Protocol was adopted at COP 10 in 2010 (BUCK and 
HAMILTON, 2011; FREIN and MEYER, 2010). The present section addresses the 
Nagoya Protocol's design in terms of compliance provisions and access standards 
for GR falling within its scope. The Protocol's "user measures" (Articles 15 to 18) 
create obligations for user countries, to ensure that the utilization of GR within 
their respective jurisdictions takes place in line with the relevant principles and 
objectives of the CBD. The "international access standards" (Article 06) attempt to 
streamline access procedures in provider countries. Those standards are relevant 
for compliance in those cases where users are willing to enter into negotiated 
benefit-sharing arrangements, yet are precluded from doing so by bureaucratic or 
discriminatory legislation. Below, I show that the Protocol is heavy on 
management and light on enforcement, while leaving sufficient flexibility for 
national implementation in user countries to exclude significant amounts of GR 
from its scope. For those GR that remain within its scope, the Protocol and 
resulting implementing legislation in both provider and user countries will 
facilitate user compliance by streamlining and simplifying administrative 
procedures and applicable legislation. However, being weak on enforcement, it 
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does little to deter deliberate non-compliance in cases where large commercial 
stakes are involved. 
 
Scope 
Pursuant to its Article 03, the Protocol applies to all GR, Traditional 
Knowledge associated with GR and benefits resulting from their utilization falling 
under CBD Article 15. Read in conjunction with CBD Article 02, this includes "any 
material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of 
heredity" which is "of actual or potential value" and under the sovereignty of a 
party to the CBD. This excludes GR in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, such as 
Antarctica or the high seas. Furthermore, CBD COP 2 has decided that human GR 
are excluded from the Convention's scope (Decision II/11). 
The Protocol's temporal scope was one of the more controversial items of 
the negotiation process (WALLBOTT et al., 2014, pp. 37-38). From the text, it is 
unclear whether the Protocol applies only to GR accessed after its entry into force, 
or whether it extends to post-CBD or even pre-CBD acquisitions. The default 
interpretation, in line with Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, is that the Protocol applies exclusively to GR accessed after 12th October 
2014, its entry into force. Whether the Protocol's Article 3 reference to GR falling 
under the scope of CBD Article 15 can be construed as implying retroactivity or 
not, is a legally contentious question. That is, Article 03 could be interpreted as 
including all GR accessed since the CBD's entry into force in 1993 (IUCN, 2012, p. 
72). 
The implications of non-retroactivity critically depend on the 
interpretation of the term "access" which, surprisingly, is defined in neither the 
CBD nor the Protocol. As access requires the country of origin's PIC and possibly 
leads to benefit-sharing under MAT, what precisely constitutes "access" has 
enormous implications for GR in ex situ collections. While those GR have been 
physically removed from their respective countries of origin, access is still subject 
to the PIC requirement. "Access" can be understood to have two different 
meanings: the physical acquisition of a GR in a country of origin, or its utilization in 
biotechnological innovation processes (TVEDT and SCHEI, 2014). This means that 
it is unclear whether the Protocol is applicable "at the point of access to GR (in 
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provider countries) or at the point of utilization (in user countries)" (WALLBOTT 
et al., 2014, p. 37). Under the former interpretation, significant amounts of ex situ 
collections fall outside the Protocol's scope and their utilization will not trigger 
benefit-sharing obligations subject to the Protocol's compliance provisions. In 
other words: the Articles 15 to 18 user measures would only apply to GR acquired 
from their respective countries of origin after 12th October 2014. It is precisely this 
ambiguity which the EU implementing legislation exploits (see Section 07 below). 
 
User measures 
The Protocol's Articles 15 to 18 oblige parties to create measures for 
ensuring that utilization of GR within their jurisdictions takes place in accordance 
with the principles of PIC and MAT, as well as with the benefit-sharing objective. 
Article 15 requires each party to take "appropriate, effective and proportionate 
legislative, administrative or policy measures to provide that genetic resources 
utilized within its jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with prior 
informed consent and that mutually agreed terms have been established". Article 
16 applies a similar provision to traditional knowledge associated with GR. Articles 
15 and 16, addressing compliance with the domestic ABS frameworks of provider 
countries, are primarily relevant for cases of misappropriation. Article 18.2, 
requires parties to provide opportunities for legal recourse; and, Article 18.3 
requires them to take "appropriate measures" regarding access to justice and the 
"mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards". 
Finally, Article 17 spells out compliance support procedures applicable to both 
Articles 15 and 16. It creates standards for an internationally recognized certificate 
of compliance and obliges parties to designate "checkpoints" which "collect or 
receive, as appropriate, relevant information related to prior informed consent, to 
the source of the genetic resource, to the establishment of mutually agreed terms, 
and/or to the utilization of genetic resources, as appropriate" (Article 17.1.a.i). 
Users are required to provide the "relevant information" at the appropriate 
checkpoint, and may use the certificate of compliance to do so (Article 17.1.a.iii). 
While the certificate of compliance is conceptually close to a disclosure of origin 
requirement, long discussed both in CBD and other international forums 
(BLAKENEY, 2005; CORREA, 2005; DUTFIELD, 2005; HOARE and TARASOFSKY, 
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2007), it does not necessarily have legal effect under patent law. Parties are not 
required to designate patent offices as checkpoints, and failure to produce the 
certificate (or equivalent documentary evidence) only requires the relevant party 
to take "appropriate, effective and proportionate measures" pursuant to Articles 
15.2 or 16.2. 
 
International access standards 
A common problem with access to GR is intransparent, bureaucratic or 
discriminatory ABS legislation in provider countries (MEDAGLIA et al., 2012, pp. 
66-71). The Protocol's "International Access Standards" (Article 06) were 
originally introduced into the negotiations by the EU as a compliance support 
measure (ENB, 2008). Article 6.3 obliges parties that have chosen to request PIC 
for GR within their jurisdiction to, inter alia, take "legislative, administrative or 
policy measures, as appropriate" in order to provide for "legal certainty, clarity 
and transparency" regarding domestic ABS frameworks and for "fair and non-
arbitrary rules". From a management perspective, those international access 
standards are likely to enhance compliance, as users of GR often face complex and 
intransparent access legislation in provider countries (RENNER et al., 2012). We 
should expect rule-guided behavior to dominate over gain maximization in cases 
where few commercial stakes are involved, such as in non-commercial academic 
research (BIBER-KLEMM et al., 2014). For such purposes, the Protocol obliges 
parties to create simplified access measures (Article 8a). By streamlining 
procedures, compliance with the PIC and MAT requirements will be enhanced, at 
least for those actors without a clear preference for commercial gains. 
 
Implementing the Nagoya Protocol: the case of the EU 
The degree to which fair and equitable benefit-sharing will be achieved 
depends, to a large extent, on the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in major 
user jurisdictions. With the US being a non-party, the EU possesses the world's 
largest market for GR falling under the scope of the CBD and the Protocol. During 
the negotiation of the Protocol, the EU showed itself willing to engage with the 
demands of provider countries by conceding the need for a legally binding 
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instrument early on in the process, while insisting throughout that any compliance 
mechanisms must not be linked to patent law (OBERTHÜR and RABITZ, 2014). 
The EU is a contracting party, as a Regional Economic Integration 
Organization, to the CBD. The Nagoya Protocol is a mixed agreement: a number of 
its provisions fall under the shared competence of the EU and its member states; 
others fall under exclusive Union competence (Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Articles 03 and 04). Regulation 511/2014, approved by the 
European Parliament and the Council in March and April 2014, creates a due 
diligence standard for users utilizing genetic resources and the traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources within EU member states. The 
Regulation applies to GR accessed after the Protocol's entry into force and defines 
"access" as "the acquisition of genetic resources or of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources in a party to the Nagoya Protocol" (Article 3.3). 
As discussed in Section 06, this implies that the future utilization of GR acquired 
before 12th October 2014 and stored in ex situ collections of EU member states is 
not subject to the PIC requirement. As both the CBD and the Protocol leave 
"access" undefined, the EU interpretation of the term excludes large amounts of 
samples, collected in the past but usable in the future, from the scope of the 
Regulation. 
The Regulation establishes three compliance mechanisms: best practices 
employed by users and recognized by the Commission (Article 08), the 
establishment of a central register to which collection holders may voluntarily 
accede (Article 05) and the obligation of users to exercise due diligence "to 
ascertain that genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources which they utilize have been accessed in accordance with applicable 
access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements, and that 
benefits are fairly and equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms" (Article 4.1). 
I address each in turn. 
First, GR included in the voluntary internet-based Register of Collections 
may only be transferred to third parties subject to documentary evidence that they 
were acquired in accordance with the appropriate ABS laws and/or regulations 
and, where relevant, that MAT have been established (Article 5.3). The Register 
also requires the use of unique identifiers and tools for tracking and monitoring 
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the transfer of resources to third parties (Article 5.3.d-e). Second, the Commission 
may recognize best practices when they are considered to implement effectively 
the due diligence and monitoring requirements under Articles 04 and 07. 
Recognition shall be withdrawn when there is evidence that a best practice is 
ineffective in facilitating user compliance. Following a best practice does not 
automatically exempt users from exercising due diligence. However, through the 
recognition of best practices, the Commission can establish a set of voluntary 
standards that facilitate compliance. 
Third, Article 4.3 requires users to "seek, keep and transfer" an 
internationally recognized certificate of compliance or documentation of date and 
place of access, description of the resource and the direct source from which it was 
obtained, whether ABS-related rights and obligations, and, where available, access 
permits and/or MAT, exist. Pursuant to Article 4.5, where users supply insufficient 
information or where access and utilization are subject to persistent legal 
uncertainty, users are obliged either to obtain an access permit and establish MAT 
or to cease utilization. Possession of the Certificate or equivalent information 
needs to be documented at the "stage of final development of a product developed 
via the utilization of genetic resources" (Article 7.2.). Additionally, competent 
authorities are required to actively check for user compliance, including the 
possible use of "on-the-spot" checks (Article 09). Where users are in non-
compliance, member states are required to implement "effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive" penalties (Article 11.2). 
The Regulation emphasizes management over enforcement. Where users 
are intrinsically motivated to comply, the existence of best practices and 
information-sharing under the Register helps users to identify the existence of PIC 
requirements and to enter into benefit-sharing arrangements based on MAT. 
Particularly, for non-commercial academic research, the level of compliance will 
likely be enhanced due to greater transparency under the Register, while 
compliance costs are reduced through recognized best practices. Additionally, the 
requirement that those recipients of public research funding, which are involved in 
the utilization of GR, declare their exercise of due diligence (Article 7.1) raises the 
awareness of the legal framework. 
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In principle, however, the enforcement component of the Regulation 
allows users to shirk their benefit-sharing obligations easily. First, where a 
certificate of compliance is considered unavailable, the minimum threshold for 
utilization to be compliant with Article 04 is documentation regarding date and 
place of access, description of the resource in question, its direct source, and 
whether rights and obligations regarding ABS are present or absent. Access 
permits and MAT, on the other hand, are only required "where available" (Article 
4.3.b). Here, the difficulty lies in distinguishing between genuine orphan GR for 
which the country of origin cannot be determined anymore, and GR which are 
falsely declared to be of unknown origin in order to avoid the sharing of benefits. 
Considering the frequently long supply chains through which GR are transferred 
before utilization takes place, the requirement to disclose the immediate source 
may not be enough to establish whether or not utilization takes place in 
accordance with PIC and MAT. 
Second, considering the difficulty in determining the precise date at which 
a GR has been added to an ex situ collection, pre-dating the time of access to before 
the Protocol's entry into force removes the resource in question from the scope of 
the Regulation. 
Finally, the Regulation delegates the question of sanctions to the EU 
member states, requiring merely that penalties be "effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive" (Article 11.2). While member state implementation, including the 
designation of competent national authorities, is still ongoing, the basic dilemma is 
that countries with strong sectoral interests possess considerable leeway in 
determining the penalties intended to deter domestic users from non-compliance 
with third country legislation.  
 
Conclusions 
The Nagoya Protocol has been described as a "masterpiece in creative 
ambiguity" (ENB, 2010, p. 26), which has "left experts puzzled about what exactly 
has been agreed on for many critical issues, […] giving rise to a range of partially 
conflicting interpretations" (ICTSD, 2010). Textual ambiguity has allowed parties 
holding widely differing interests to agree on a legally binding outcome after a 
difficult negotiation process which, until the very end, was in danger of collapsing 
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(NIJAR, 2011, pp. 03-15). While the international constellation of interests explains 
the lack of precision and stringency, the Protocol's enforcement components are 
unlikely to contribute significantly to the implementation of the objective of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing. Assuming that "[w]hen a company's shareholders 
want the largest return from their investment, […] voluntary benefit sharing is an 
illusion" (TVEDT, 2014), insufficient enforcement provisions translate directly into 
low regime effectiveness. 
At the same time, we should expect the international access standards and 
facilitated access procedures for non-commercial research to enhance compliance 
in cases where commercial stakes are absent. The Protocol thus constitutes a 
"mixed bag", with its enforcement components falling far short of the demands 
which provider countries have been voicing for over a decade. However, 
considering the overall problem structure, that is, the zero-sum nature of 
(particularly monetary) benefit-sharing, strongly diverging economic interests 
among key actors, practical difficulties with monitoring the transnational 
utilization of GR, as well as pervasive uncertainty regarding the global extent of 
biopiracy and its costs, the Protocol highlights how regime design is (at least 
partially) endogenous to problem structure (MITCHELL, 2006). As domestic 
measures within major user jurisdictions are indispensable for implementing the 
benefit-sharing objective, it is thus not surprising that provider countries, being 
the demandeurs of the Protocol, yet lacking significant leverage in the negotiation 
process, failed to achieve a more favorable outcome. 
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